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Austria´s European Policy and its Coordination and 
Decision-making System at the Turn of the 21st Century12
Martin Jeřábek
Abstract: The study describes Austria‘s relationship to the EU and the processes 
the country underwent in the past thirteen years as an EU member state. Due to 
its EU accession Austria went through a process of Europeanization. This paper 
analyses the top-down and bottom-up effects of this process. The author begins by 
asking to what extent Europeanization had an impact on the coordination mecha-
nisms of Austrian politics, in particular, the executive and the legislative, and the 
speciﬁ c features of the Austrian political system: federalism and corporatism. The 
analysis shows that the adaptation of institutions to EU model signiﬁ cantly affected 
Austrian politics. The second part of the paper analyses the bottom-up effects, how 
domestic political processes inﬂ uenced the Austrian European policy. Despite the 
strong Europeanization of Austria‘s domestic institutions the research found some 
problem junctures in the relationship between Austria and the EU. This included the 
issue of the coalition government that was formed with the participation of the FPÖ 
in 2000 and the sanctions other EU member states placed on Austria as a response. 
Another case occurred when Austria threatened to veto EU eastern expansion in 
2001. On the basis of these two cases it was found that despite the adaptation of 
domestic institutions, domestic politics can still have a strong effect on European 
relations. However, the long-term trend in Austrian European policy indicates that 
the relationship between strong institutional adaptation and the country‘s positive 
pro-European policy is primarily harmonious.
Keywords: Austria, political system, European policy, coordination system, 
European Union, federalism and the EU, corporatism 
Introduction
Austria has been a member of the European Union for over a decade now. Aus-
tria’s ofﬁ cial request for full membership in the EC13 did not come until 17 July 
1989. It was preceded by a domestic political debate over the advantages and dis-
advantages of membership in the EC, against the background of the changes that 
were occurring in the East-West relationship and intensifying European integration. 
12 This article was not proof-readed by the Politics in Central Europe. The autor holds the full re-
sponsibility for the language quality of the article.
13 ECSC, EEC and EUROATOM.
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Austria feared the negative economic impact of remaining permanently outside the 
EC common market, a project that the EC tabled in 1985. Austria wanted to belong 
to the European economic area and the EC, but politically it continued to insist on 
maintaining its neutrality.14 The referendum on the Constitutional Act on the Acces-
sion of Austria to the EU was held on 12 June 1994 and it was the ﬁ rst mandatory 
referendum in the country’s history.15 The majority of Austrian voters expressed 
their agreement (66.58 % voted for membership, 33.4 % voted against) with joining 
the European Union.16 
Austria joined the EU at the same time as Finland and Sweden as part of what 
was called the northern expansion on 1 January 1995. Austria implemented the 
principles of the Maastricht Treaty17, became part of the Schengen area, and along 
with the other eleven member states adopted the Euro as its currency on 1 January 
1999. Austria experienced strong economic growth after the Second World War, 
ranking it among the economically advanced EU states and the countries that are 
net payers into the EU budget. 
The study aims to analyse the ongoing process of the “Europeanization”18 of Aus-
tria’s domestic political institutions following Austria’s accession to the EU. Robert 
Ladrech understands Europeanization as an “incremental process reorienting the 
direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynam-
ic become part of the organisational logic of national politics and policy-making” 
(Ladrech 1994: 69). This top-down dynamic and the impact of European integra-
tion on the national institutions of Austria will be examined in the ﬁ rst part of this 
study. Our assumption is that Austria, a small Central European state, is highly Eu-
ropeanized, despite its relatively late accession to the EU,  is highly Europeanised, 
and we will attempt here to verify/falsify this assumption. Our analysis focuses 
especially on the main political subjects involved in the country’s integration policy 
and the decision-making system of the executive and legislative authorities and of 
14 For a legal analysis of “accession to the EC with the exception of neutrality”, see Hummer (1996: 
25, 28-38).
15 The necessary constitutional changes assumed the nature of overall changes to the Federal Con-
stitution of the Republic of Austria, and according to Art. 44 Par. 3 of the Austrian Constitution 
(Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz) (B.-VG.) these must be submitted to a referendum. The Austrian 
Constitution document that even includes parts of treaties and statutes that are classiﬁ ed as con-
stitutional (e.g. a State Treaty). For the purpose of this paper the abbreviated title of the Austrian 
Constitution will be used (see Klokočka, Wagnerová 2004: 419-508).
16 Conditional on the participation of 82.4 % of Austrian voters.
17 Austria committed itself to the principles of the Maastricht Treaty. While preserving its neutrality, 
the Austrian government also managed to maintain strong environmental protections (especially 
in connection with the use of nuclear energy), was granted transitional periods in relation to 
freight transit, and maintained regulations in the area of agricultural policy, for more see Itzlinger 
(1996: 52).
18 For more on the use of the term “Europeanization” in contemporary literature, see Dančák, Fiala 
and Hloušek (2005: 11). 
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the Federal States and it also looks at the constitutional requirements for Austria’s 
membership in the European Union.
The top-down dynamic is an important dimension of integration, but the bottom-
up dynamic is no less signiﬁ cant. We believe that the relationship between the EU 
and member state (in our case Austria) institutions is a two-way interaction (for more 
see Hussein 2005: 287). In the relationship between the EU and Austria, the impact 
of European structures on Austria’s domestic policy is just one side of the coin. The 
other side is Austria’s policy towards the European Union. Another objective of our 
analysis is therefore to ﬁ nd out how Austria has engaged as an inﬂ uential actor in the 
EU and how Austrian policy has been applied within the European Union. 
In order to examine these questions we analyse three cases. The ﬁ rst case study 
is devoted to Austria’s EU Presidency, which it ﬁ rst held in the second half of 1998 
and then again in 2006. The second study deals with the critical juncture in Aus-
tria’s relationships with the other EU member states. A critical period occurred 
after the controversial “black-blue” coalition government was set up in February 
2000, formed by the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) and Haider’s populist right-
wing Freedom Party (FPÖ). In protest, fourteen EU countries invoked sanctions 
against Austria, which remained in effect until 12 September of that year. The third 
case study relates to the important challenge that Austria’s European policy faced 
when the EU began the process of eastern enlargement. 
The Europeanization of Austria’s domestic decision-making system (the top-
down dynamic)
There are several bases for the system of decision-making and coordination that 
lies behind Austria’s European policy and it is possible to distinguish between in-
ternal and external factors of the Europeanization of Austria. Internal factors refer 
to the features and the institutional structure of the political system of Austria and 
also to some speciﬁ c characteristics of Austrian politics: the federal structure of the 
country, social partnerships, corporatism and the consensual orientation of political 
and ofﬁ cial elites that, despite weakening ties, persisted in the “grand coalition” of 
the SPÖ and the ÖVP (Morass 1996: 35). 
In addition to these internal factors, the formation of decision-making mechanisms 
has been inﬂ uenced by the external circumstances of Austria’s accession to the EU. 
Austria joined the EU at a time when integration was already well advanced, espe-
cially in terms of the common economic and political life of member states. Conse-
quently, it was not possible to integrate the Austrian system of government by sectors 
on the basis of selected areas of integration, and instead the integrative capacity of the 
entire system had to be developed at once. This gave rise also to a need to coordinate 
everything, from the individual steps taken to the country’s uniﬁ ed political line to-
wards the European Union. The deepening integration that the Maastricht Treaty set 
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in motion meant that even Austria was increasingly confronted with the question of 
democratic legitimacy. Austria was able to draw on the example of Germany, which as 
part of constitutional amendments after 1990 introduced stronger institutional checks 
on Europapolitik on the part of the national parliament and the Federal States. 
The powers of the executive in EU affairs
There are two centres of executive power in Austria – the federal government 
and the President. The government is usually a coalition of parties and is only 
rarely formed by just one party. The government (Ministerrat) acts as a collective 
body and comprises the Chancellor (the head of government), the Vice-Chancellor, 
ministers, and state secretaries. The executive bodies in each of the Federal States 
are headed by a state governor (Landeshauptmann).  The President of Austria 
is elected to ofﬁ ce for a six-year term and derives his legitimacy from direct elec-
tions. The President’s role is largely ceremonial. Presidential acts are countersigned 
by the Chancellor or the relevant minister. The President wields the formal powers 
of naming the government and at the government’s recommendation dissolving the 
National Council, but the parliamentary nature of the political system is respected. 
Heinz Fischer is currently the President of the Austrian Republic.
The executive authority occupied a central role in the decision-making process 
pertaining to EU affairs. From the outset, the individual ministries of the Austrian 
system of government were at the forefront of the process (Pelinka 2003: 527). Rep-
resentation of the Austrian state in talks in the EU Council of Ministers (Council 
of the European Union) was regarded as the responsibility of the relevant minister, 
reserving the alternative possibility for that minister to be represented by another 
minister or by a state secretary from another ministry.19 The task of coordinating the 
country’s European policy is divided between the Ofﬁ ce of the Chancellor and the 
Foreign Ministry. These two institutions also directly and jointly take part in prepar-
ing the agenda for the European Council or the Intergovernmental Conference. In 
the period of the “grand coalition”, this cooperation corresponded well with the 
coalition policy of tandem responsibility, where the Chancellor was responsible 
for the overall coordination of government policy (and for representing Austria at 
meetings of the European Council), and the Foreign Ministry participated in meet-
ings of the General Affairs Council (Morass 1996: 36). 
In June 1994 a dispute over competences occurred in connection with who was 
to represent Austria at a top gathering of government heads at a meeting of the 
19 From the start there has been a problem with assigning matters dealt with at the EU Council to the 
relevant minister. The division of specialisations in the EU did not thematically match the division 
of competences of among individual Austrian ministries. Therefore, the ministry that is to lead the 
negotiations is regularly designated in advance. 
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European Council in Corfu, where an Austrian representative was to sign the EU 
Accession Treaty. Although previous Austrian presidents had not attempted to play 
an independent role in foreign policy, President Thomas Klestil (1992–2004) in-
sisted on taking part in this European summit, thereby following in the footsteps of 
the French president. It was his intention to act on the right of the president to rep-
resent the state abroad, which is stipulated in Art. 65 of the Austrian Constitution. 
However, Chancellor Franz Vranitzky asserted the authority of his position in this 
dispute as the ofﬁ cial who determines the country’s foreign policy. The Austrian 
president acknowledged the Chancellor’s legal arguments that representation in EU 
politics is not the same thing as representation of the state abroad as deﬁ ned in Art. 
65 of the Constitution and withdrew from participating in other top meetings of the 
European Council in Essen and in Madrid (Pelinka 2003: 524).
The role of parliament in decision-making 
Legislative power in Austria is vested in the two-chamber Parliament, which is 
dominated by the directly elected National Council (Nationalrat), while the Federal 
Council (Bundesrat) represents the interests of the federal states (nine states, in-
cluding Vienna). The upper chamber – the Federal Council – plays a much weaker 
role in the legislative process. Usually it just has the right to use a suspensive veto, 
and it has the right of absolute veto only in the case of constitutional bills and bills 
directly pertaining to the powers of the Federal States. Members of the Federal 
Council are elected indirectly by members of the representative bodies of the indi-
vidual Federal States. The Constitution gives a full description (catalogue) of which 
legislative areas remain in the competence of the state and which fall within the 
scope of legislative powers of the elected Federal State legislatures.  
In comparison with other EU countries, where European policy has a strong 
executive character, the Austrian National Council exercises considerable author-
ity over affairs connected with the EU. Members of the government are required 
without delay to inform the National Council and the Federal Council (more details 
on the Federal Council in the section on Austrian federalism) about all proposals 
within the European Union and in doing so provide Parliament with the opportunity 
to formulate a position on issues. Thanks to the active role it has played in establish-
ing Austria’s position in the EU, parliament is able to assume co-responsibility for 
Austria’s European policy. A constitutional amendment introduced before Austria 
joined the EU gave the National Council extensive rights to intervene in the deci-
sions of the government in matters pertaining to the EU.20 Article 23e of the Aus-
trian Constitution obliges members of the government who discuss and vote in the 
20 Art. 23e, 23f of the Austrian Constitution.
Politics in Central Europe 4 (June 2008) 1
43
European Union to adhere to the position of the National Council (lower chamber). 
A member of government can deviate from the National Council’s position “only 
for essential reasons of foreign and integration policy” (Art. 23e, Par. 2 of the Aus-
trian Constitution). In this case the given member is required to submit a report on 
the reasons that led him or her to deviate from the ofﬁ cial position of the National 
Council. A similar mechanism functions for decisions of the government in matters 
pertaining to the foreign and security policy of the EU and in areas of cooperation 
in issues of the justice and interior.  
The National Council monitors the steps of the national government in the EU 
Council through the Executive Committee (Hauptausschuss). This permanent 
parliamentary committee regularly reviews European legislation. However, it se-
lects for itself which topics it intends to focus its attention on. The agenda for 
the committee (which usually meets once every two weeks) is compiled by the 
“preparatory committee”, made up of representatives from every parliamentary 
group (Morass 1996: 38). 
The participation of parliament in government decision-making relating to EU 
issues allows opposition parties in the National Council an opportunity to monitor 
decisions. It was primarily the opposition parties (Greens) who demanded that the 
constitutional reform in 1994 incorporate guarantees for the substantial participa-
tion of parliament in the decision-making process. The opposition therefore pos-
sesses the potential to effectively inﬂ uence the government’s position. In terms of 
the nature of democratic government in the EU, it warrants praise that every posi-
tion Austria adopts in the EU Council can potentially be traced right back through 
to the parliamentary level. This accords the decisions of the Austrian government 
a democratic legitimacy. However, the practical impact of parliamentary checks 
on the government in EU affairs is small (Falkner − Laffan 2005: 219). Since join-
ing the EU the National Council has issued only several dozen binding opinions. 
The problem is that the role of parliament in decision-making slows the process of 
formulating a deﬁ nitive political opinion. The cumbersome process of communica-
tion between the relevant minister and the Executive Committee has often been 
criticised. It is difﬁ cult for ministers to maintain any continuous consultation with 
the Executive Committee in the ﬁ nal stage of negotiations in the EU Council. 
Austrian federalism and municipalities in EU affairs – the position of 
the Federal States 
Austria is a federal republic. The key principles of its political system are laid out 
in the Federal Constitution of 1920, which remains in effect to date in the amended 
form adopted in 1929. In Austria (like in Germany), the Federal States possess an 
independent identity not derived from the federation. The state’s federal character 
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stems from the relatively autonomous legislative function of the Federal States 
(Walter − Mayer 1996: 70). The Federal States participate in creating the laws of 
the federation through the Federal Council (Bundesrat), and in executive action 
through the Federal Administration. Since the 1970s the federal principle has been 
asserted with increasing rigour. A constitutional amendment from 1984 expanded 
the powers of the Federal Council. An important feature of the Austrian federal state 
is the fact that it is the interests of political parties rather than the interests of the 
Federal States that are of decisive relevance (Weber 1996: 52).  
Judicial power is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Austrian Republic, 
not the Federal States. In the sphere of public administration the highest judicial 
instance is the Administrative Court. The Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerich-
tshof) reviews the constitutionality of laws, and it deals with disputes between the 
Federal States or between the Federal States and the federal government. The ab-
sence of any independent judicial power at the individual state level and the fact 
that the Federal Council occupies a weak position in the legislative process seem to 
conﬁ rm the theory that Austria is something like a unitary federal state, or in other 
words, Austrian federalism is weak (Říchová 2002: 131-162). 
When Austria joined the EU there was no signiﬁ cant strengthening of federalism, 
which the Federal States had hoped for from membership. By strengthening their 
powers in relation to the national political system they had hoped to compensate 
for the eventual decline of their own inﬂ uence in the EU’s system of “multi-level 
governance” (MLG) that would result from the primarily executive nature of the 
formulation of European policy in individual member states.  
A constitutional amendment in 1992 established only the principles for the par-
ticipation of the Federal States in decisions on affairs connected with the EU. The 
Constitution obliges the national government to inform the States (Bundesländer) 
about proposals relating to the EU and to ensure that the Federal States are able to 
co-decide on matters that fall under the legislative authority of the Federal States 
or concern their interests. The Federal States must agree unanimously on an opin-
ion and opinion is binding for the national government in negotiations in Brussels 
(Art. 23d, Par. 2 Austrian Constitution). The government can only deviate from that 
opinion if it is necessary for foreign policy reasons or for reasons of political inte-
gration. At the practical level, the above rules do not make the participation of the 
Federal States easy. The need for the consensus of all the Federal States only rarely 
leads to a united opinion being carried (Falkner − Laffan 2005: 220). Moreover, 
owing frequently to different interests, the Federal States are unable to react ﬂ exibly 
to EU proposals. 
The Federal States can moreover participate directly in talks in the European 
Union. If any legislative proposal within the EU relates to a matter that falls under 
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the legislative authority of the Federal States, the federal government can transfer 
participation in talks in the EU Council to a representative selected by the Federal 
States.21 However, practical instances of this practice since Austria joined the EU 
have illustrated the government’s effort to make it difﬁ cult for the Federal States 
to personally take part in joint delegations (Weber 1996: 54). Another method of 
involving the Federal States is through the person of a joint delegate of the Federal 
States within the diplomatic structure of Austria’s Permanent Representation to the 
EU (Ständige Vertretung). 
The activities of so-called Eurobüros, which were set up by the individual Federal 
States after Austria joined the EU, are evidence of the fact that the Federal States do 
not feel that they are adequately represented by the government in Brussels. Along-
side these information centres of the Federal States in Brussels, representatives of 
the States are among the participants in the EU’s Committee of the Regions, which is 
made up of members of local and regional bodies, including Federal State governors 
and even representatives of the Associations of Cities and Municipalities (Städte- 
und Gemeindebund). Representatives of the Federal States have from the outset of 
Austria’s membership in the EU been very active in the Committee of the Regions 
and have promoted development of the Union in the direction of a Europe of regions. 
A prime example of this trend is the cross-border cooperation of the Italian regions 
of Bolzano and Trento (Southern Tyrol) and the Austrian Federal State of Tyrol.     
Austrian municipalities are able to participate in EU affairs at the European (Com-
mittee of the Regions) and national levels (Council for Issues of Austrian Integration 
Policy).22 They do so through the Austrian Association of Cities and the Austrian 
Association of Municipalities (Art. 115 of the Austrian Constitution).23 The Aus-
trian Association of Municipalities became a member of the Council of European 
Municipalities and Regions (CEMR) at the very start of European integration in the 
1950s.24 The Association selects three delegates out of the twelve Austrian members 
as representatives in the Committee of the Regions. The rule that applies in the re-
lationship between the centre and local administration is that whenever a particular 
European bill affects “the sphere of autonomous authority of the municipalities” or 
municipal interests, the national government is required to inform the municipalities 
21 Art. 23d, Par. 3 of the Austrian Constitution. 
22 In Czech literature, Miroslava Pitrová’s master thesis (which she successfully defended at the Fac-
ulty of Philosophy and Arts at West Czech University in Pilsen in 2006) is devoted to the subject 
of Austrian communal politics.
23 Http://www.sbg.ac.at/pol/regionastudies/dokumente/d-gemeinde/d-gemeinden-2stell.htm#a. (3 
August 2007)
24 In 1993 the Council of European Municipalities and Regions joined up with the IULA (Interna-
tional Union of Local Authorities) and became its European branch. This merging of tow interna-
tional municipal interest groups made the Austrian Association of Municipalities automatically a 
member of the IULA; see http://www.iula.org. (2 August 2007)
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without delay and provide them with an opportunity to formulate an opinion on it 
(Art. 23d Par. 1 of the Austrian Constitution). In terms of the administrative struc-
tures for drawing on EU Structural Funds, Austria is part of the NUTS II units. 
Lower Austria, Upper Austria, Styria, and Vienna (each of these Federal States has a 
population of more than one million) are NUTS II regions, which correspond to the 
territorial administrative divisions of the Austrian state and to the individual Federal 
States. The regions and municipalities of Austria each have a share in the funds 
that are targeted for areas deﬁ ned under Objective 2 of EU regional policy and they 
participate in EU programmes such as Interreg III (Pitrová 2006: 56). 
Political parties in the process of European integration 
The Austrian Constitution documents the legal continuity of the Republic of 
Austria from its date of origin in 1918 to date. At the start of the Second Republic 
political parties referred back to the democratic development of the First Republic, 
interrupted by the establishment of an autocratic regime (1934–38) and subsequent-
ly the annexation of Austria to the Third Reich (1938–45). Between the late 1940s 
and the 1980s the Austrian party system was highly concentrated. At the peak of 
this trend (1975) 90 % of Austrian voters were voting for one of two large parties: 
the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) or the Austrian Socialist Party (SPÖ).25 A third 
political party, the Austrian Freedom Party (originally called the Federation of Inde-
pendents - VdU, and renamed the FPÖ in 1956), was much weaker. Thus there was 
a two-and-a-half party system operating in Austria. When the Greens entered the 
National Council in 1986 and when preferences for the populist right-wing Free-
dom Party (FPÖ) began to grow, changes began to emerge in the party system and 
in the voting behaviour of Austrian voters. The traditional political camps (Lager) 
of labour, represented by the SPÖ26, and conservatives, represented by the ÖVP, 
gradually lost their ability to attract a stable base of voters. However, a fundamental 
change occurred with the elections to the National Council in October 1999. 
Paradoxically, up until the 1980s, the marginal FPÖ was the only party that ex-
pressed full support for Austria’s integration into the EC. The FPÖ was the ﬁ rst 
to incorporate the idea that even while maintaining neutrality Austria could still 
take an active part in the European integration process in their party programme 
on 1 July 1985 (Hummer 1996: 38). From the mid-1980s the Austrian People’s 
Party also began to proﬁ le itself as a “pro-European” party.27 The Austrian Social-
25 On the party and electoral system of the Second Austrian Republic and the “cleavages” inﬂ uenc-
ing the voting behaviour of Austrians, see Hloušek (2006: 24-40). 
26 The Austrian Socialist Party (SPÖ) was renamed in 1991 as the Austrian Social Democratic 
Party.
27 On the positions of Austrian political parties towards European integration, see Pollak; Slominski 
(2001).
Politics in Central Europe 4 (June 2008) 1
47
ist Party was the last to show support for the country joining the EC and only 
began doing so under the leadership of Franz Vranitzky, Chancellor of the “grand 
coalition” in 1987–1997. 
At the start of the 1990s the FPÖ radically altered its position. In 1991 they 
began to actively campaign against European integration and during the period 
of accession talks they tried to win the votes of everyone opposed to the pro-
integration policy of the grand coalition. Austria’s preparation for EU accession 
required the introduction of the most substantial changes to its Constitution since 
1929. In order for Austria to be ready to sign the EU Accession Treaty on 24 
June 1994, it had to enact major legislation affecting the Constitution. Voting 
in the National Council (Nationalrat), the Federal Council (Bundesrat), and the 
referendum were preceded by an information campaign and discussion of the 
advantages and disadvantages of Austria’s membership. Although there was a 
consensus among political elites that Austria should have an opportunity to con-
tribute to decision-making within the European Union, the opposition parties, the 
Austrian Green Party and Haider’s FPÖ, campaigned against joining the EU. Jörg 
Haider in particular took advantage of this issue to mobilise voters against the 
“pro-European” coalition of the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) and the Austrian 
People’s Party (ÖVP). The only opposition party to support the government camp 
was Heide Schmidt’s Liberal Forum (LIF) (Gehler − Kaiser 2002: 316; Greiderer 
− Pelinka 1996: 145). 
 In 1994 the Greens as well as the FPÖ voted against joining the EU. But unlike 
the FPÖ the Green Party, despite its initial reservations towards Austrian mem-
bership in the EU, began to support the integration process and Austria’s active 
participation in it (Hloušek − Sychra 2004: 27). The FPÖ, however, maintained its 
negative stance towards EU membership, evident, for example, in the (unsuccess-
ful) proposal submitted by the FPÖ functionary Susanne Riess-Passer in 1997 that 
a referendum be held on adopting or rejecting the Euro as currency. 
Austrian politics in 2000-2006 are of interest for the topic of this paper with 
regard to the effect of party politics on the European policy of a particular state. 
During this period Austria’s positions on current issues of European integration 
were more than ever before inﬂ uenced by party conﬂ icts and the tension between 
the ruling coalition of the ÖVP and Haider’s FPÖ. Europe’s stances towards Austria 
were also fundamentally inﬂ uenced by the participation of the Freedom Party in the 
government (see above for more on the sanctions against Austria). Particularly in 
the ﬁ rst term of the coalition and up to the FPÖ’s losses in the early elections held on 
24 November 2002, Haider’s Freedom Party endeavoured to orchestrate problems 
in connection with the EU’s eastern enlargement and deeper European integration 
and use them for their own short-term political gain. For example, the  FPÖ tried to 
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impose a referendum (January 2002) on the Temelín nuclear power plant and threat-
ened to veto the Czech Republic’s accession to the EU  (Gehler 2005: 96-98). The 
Beneš decrees, free movement of labour, and freight transit through the Alp regions 
of Austria were all topics they raised in direct connection with EU enlargement.  
Internal party conﬂ icts and an election loss in the autumn of 2002 (the ÖVP re-
ceived 42.3 % of the vote, the FPÖ only 10.16 %!) meant that the Freedom Party 
was no longer able to effectively pursue a negativist EU policy. In the second coali-
tion term (the Schüssel II cabinet) in 2002–2006, the Austrian government set a 
clear pro-European course and encouraged the successful conclusion of the EU’s 
eastern enlargement and the European Convention negotiations on the draft treaty 
to establish a constitution for Europe. In the Austrian National Council, members 
of the ÖVP, in cooperation with the opposition SPÖ and the Green Party, voted in 
favour of eastern enlargement.  
After the victory of the Social Democrats in the 2006 elections, Austria again 
found itself in the midst of a political turnaround, where the preconditions were 
even stronger for a “return” to a grand coalition. In 2007 a coalition government 
was set up and headed by the Social Democratic Chancellor Alfred Gusenbauer. 
Austrian neo-corporatism and the European Union  
The political system of the Second Austrian Republic has a speciﬁ c political 
culture characterised by consensual democracy, backed up by a model of social 
partnership (Sozialpartnerschaft) and coordinated links between interest groups 
and politics.28 This method of negotiating over fundamental economic and social is-
sues was primarily advanced during the years of the coalition between the Austrian 
People’s Party and the Socialist Party in 1945/47-1966 and 1986/87-1999/2000. 
The umbrella bodies of the Austrian Trade Union Federation (Österreichischer 
Gewerkschaftsbund, ÖGB) and the Federation of Austrian Industry (Vereinigung 
österreischischer Industrieller, VÖI), and the economic and agricultural chambers 
and worker and employee chambers, membership in which is usually mandatory, all 
create the basis for Austria’s neo-corporatism. 
Social partnership is an institutionalised form of cooperation and it is a basic fea-
ture of corporate relations. The established right of social partners to be involved in 
the legislative process or to review wage and price policies (Paritätische Kommis-
sion für Lohn- und Preisfragen) made social partnership an important factor in po-
litical decision-making in Austria. The strength of the inﬂ uence organised interests 
have had in the political sphere peaked in the 1970s.29 Despite the gradual decline 
28 Some authors write about the formation of neo-corporative structures (Pelinka 2003: 542; Pri-
sching 2002: 299-320).
29 In 1973, 51 % of the functionaries in economic unions and economic and working chambers also 
Politics in Central Europe 4 (June 2008) 1
49
in their signiﬁ cance, interest groups were important actors in the accession process, 
throwing their support behind Austria’s EU membership (Tálos − Karlhofer 1996: 
69). While supporting Austria’s integration into the EU, representatives of interest 
groups simultaneously strove to acquire for themselves adequate rights to take part 
in decision-making on European affairs.30 In the “European agreement” of April 
1994, the governing SPÖ and ÖVP committed themselves to ensuring the adequate 
involvement of the four main interest groups in the domestic political process, in 
EU committees, and even in the diplomatic representation of the Austrian Republic 
in Brussels (Tálos − Karlhofer 1996: 70). 
The interest group umbrella organisations, the federations, are able to take part 
in the decision-making process at various levels. Alongside their formal involve-
ment, for example, in the legislative process (Begutachtungsverfahren), their 
informal contacts are traditionally also a source of signiﬁ cant inﬂ uence. Interest 
groups cooperate with the ministries (social affairs, the economy, and agriculture) 
and take part in preparations for meetings of the Committee of Permanent Rep-
resentatives (Coreper), which is the responsibility of the Ofﬁ ce of the Chancellor 
and the Foreign Ministry. Through indirect party contacts they can also have an 
inﬂ uence on discussions in the Executive Committee (Hauptausschuss) of the 
National Council. 
As Austria was drawn into the EC and began to act as a fully ﬂ edged EU member, 
two processes at two levels were unleashed. In one respect, membership in the EU 
led at the national level to a reduction in the amount of inﬂ uence organised interest 
groups wield, because many of the national affairs that the groups were able to 
participate in directly prior to Austria’s EU membership are regularly addressed 
at the supranational, European level. Despite the joint and very often consensual 
approach of the state and interest groups, representatives of the national govern-
ment are still exclusively regarded as the ofﬁ cial representatives of Austria in the 
committees of the EU (according to EU rules). It is always left to the discretion of 
the relevant minister whether to invite representatives of other organisations in the 
social partnership to take part in the meetings of European committees and make 
them a member of the delegation, but they can only participate as observers and 
have no negotiating powers (Falkner − Laffan 2005: 221). The position of social 
partners in the political system also depends heavily on the state of national politics, 
especially considering the centralising efforts of the centre-right coalition govern-
ment of the ÖVP and the FPÖ in 2000-2006. 
However, in another respect, that is, in terms of the manoeuvring room of inter-
est groups, there has also been a positive side to Austria’s gravitation towards the 
held a seat in the National Council; in 1995 the ﬁ gure was only 19 % of active functionaries.
30 Österreich und die europäische Integration, Stellungnahme der Sozialpartner, 1 March 1989.
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EC/EU. At the level of the EC, Austrian interest groups and federations (ÖGB, 
VÖI, Wirtschaftskammer Österreich - WKÖ) had become members of European 
organisations even before Austria joined the EU.31 In these activities they were able 
to beneﬁ t from their monopolistic position in the state in their given branch. In this 
respect the Austrian model of social partnership is not likely to be exported to the 
supranational, EU level. Probably the opposite process is to be expected. National 
corporate structures will increasingly be inﬂ uenced through organised interest-
group lobbying at the European level.  
Austria as an EU member – from “ideal pupil” to “diffi cult child” (the 
bottom-up dynamic)
In the previous chapters we analysed the impact of the EU on Austrian national 
political structures and found that the level of Europeanization of Austria is rela-
tively high. Below we will examine whether (and when) Austrian institutions or 
political leaders have had a signiﬁ cant impact on EU actions or on the actions of the 
institutions of the other EU member states. Does the Europeanization of the domes-
tic policy of a country like Austria lead it towards becoming a good EU member? 
How much positive inﬂ uence did the high level of Europeanization have on the 
actors in Austrian European diplomacy so that they support “European” solutions 
in decision-making processes at the level of the EU?
The fact that two-thirds of Austrian voters expressed their support for Austria 
joining the EU in 1995 put the country in a good starting position. Austria fulﬁ lled 
all the requirements for becoming an economically and politically successful mem-
ber of the EU. In the country’s thirteen-year history as a member, there have been 
periods when Austria has genuinely met those expectations (case 1), but there have 
also critical periods, as will be shown in case 2 and partly also in case 3.
Case 1: The Austrian Presidency of the Council of the European Union 
in 1998 and 2006
When the Presidency of the EU Council passed to Austria in the second half of 
1998 the country demonstrated its capability of assuming responsibility for EU 
policy. However, despite how well organised and prepared Austria was, some exter-
nal factors (e.g. the national elections in Germany) had a decisive inﬂ uence on the 
timeframe of the Presidency (Schallenberg − Thun-Hohenstein 1999). Nonetheless, 
Austria proved itself as the presiding country, successfully leading the talks with the 
31 VÖI joined the UNICE (the Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe), the 
WKÖ joined EUROCHAMBERS (Association of European Chambers of Commerce and Indus-
try); the ÖGB was a founding member of the ETUC (European Trade Union Confederation). 
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ﬁ rst wave of new candidate countries (Poland, Hungary, Estonia, Slovenia, the Czech 
Republic) and contributing to the introduction of the Euro on 1 January 1999. 
In the ﬁ rst half of 2006 Austria again held the EU Presidency, and the atmos-
phere on this occasion was different than during the 1998 Presidency. By 2006 the 
EU was focusing on more than just internal problems (employment policy) and 
its attention was also turned to further expansion (and the question of the future 
membership of Turkey), security threats, and global issues. During its Presidency 
Austria conducted itself in a very positive and “European” manner. This Presidency 
was an inspiration for a small Central European country like the Czech Republic, 
which will be assuming the EU Presidency in the near future. 
Case 2: The 1999 Austrian parliamentary elections and sanctions from 
the “EU14”
After the ﬁ rst ﬁ ve years of Austria’s membership in the EU, which was accom-
panied by its active approach to key integration projects, including preparation for 
the third stage of economic and monetary union, the relationship between Austria 
and the EU changed dramatically. The reason was internal political developments 
within Austria.  
In the elections to the Austrian National Council on 3 October 1999 the largest 
number of votes went to the SPÖ (33.15 %), but the FPÖ became the de facto 
winner of the elections (26.91 %), beating out the ÖVP by just 415 votes (26.91 
%), and became the second strongest parliamentary party. The Greens won 7.4 
% of the vote (Gehler 2005: 876). The President called on the head of the Social 
Democratic Party, Viktor Klima, to pursue coalition talks with members of the 
Austrian People’s Party, and when these fell apart, talks between the ÖVP and FPÖ 
were next on the agenda. In February 2000 President Thomas Klestil, reluctantly32, 
announced the formation of a “black-blue” coalition government of the ÖVP and 
the FPÖ, headed by Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel and Vice-Chancellor Susanne 
Riess-Passer from the FPÖ. 
The other fourteen EU states opposed the participation of the populist right-wing 
and xenophobic FPÖ in the Austrian government and imposed bilateral “sanctions” 
for an indeﬁ nite term against Austria, which came into effect immediately after the 
new Austrian government was sworn in on 4 February 2000 (Gehler 2002: 182). 
32 The President did not agree with the participation of the FPÖ in the government, and therefore he 
did not call on the head of the ÖVP, Schüssel, to form a government. On 2 February 2000, after a 
coalition agreement was reached between the ÖVP a FPÖ, the proposed list of Cabinet members 
was submitted to the President, who refused to name some of the ministers, but nonetheless was 
forced to respect the outcome of the elections and the consequent distribution of mandates in the 
National Council. 
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This kind of decisive and rapidly coordinated action taken by member states against 
one other member state was unprecedented in the history of European integration. 
It was, however, from the start uncertain whether the fourteen member states had 
the legal right to agree to the proposal of the Portuguese Presidency on 31 January 
2000, which read: “The governments of the fourteen member states will not sup-
port or accept any bilateral ofﬁ cial contacts on the political level with an Austrian 
Government of which the FPÖ is a part; they will not support Austrian candidates 
for posts in international organisations; Austrian ambassadors in the capitals of 
EU cities will only be accepted on a technical level.”33 
This joint decision of 14 EU states was highly medialized and in the initial 
months during which it was in effect it resulted in the international isolation of 
Austria. The fact that the other democratic states were opposed to the participa-
tion of a populist right-wing party in the government of another member state 
was not just the expression of a moral position but also a defence of the EU’s 
common values, as articulated in Art. 6 in the European Union Treaty (Gehler 
2002: 187). However, from a legal perspective, Schüssel’s government had not 
actually infringed on any democratic principles, and an especially problematic is-
sue was that sanctions were to apply for an indeﬁ nite period. They would only be 
de facto repealed if the “black-blue” Austrian government stepped down. Austria 
tried to defend itself, but its interpretation of the situation was initially rejected by 
other states. Controversial was the fact that the “sanctions” were not adopted as a 
decision of the European Union but “only” its member states. Furthermore, the 
European Community’s founding treaties only explicitly prohibit discrimination 
on the basis of ethnicity (Falkner − Laffan 2005: 218). The Austrian government’s 
legal position reﬂ ected these facts, and the Federal Government based its defence 
on the argument that the statement of the Portuguese Presidency from 31 January 
2000 was an agreement at the level of international law, it lay outside the legal 
framework of the European Union (it was not a legal document of any EU body), 
and it was primarily of political signiﬁ cance. 
What kind of impact did the sanctions imposed by the other EU states have on 
domestic policy in Austria? The public threat of sanctions did nothing to deter W. 
Schüssel in his decision to set up a coalition government with the FPÖ. Future 
Chancellor Schüssel used the EU protests to his own advantage in the negotiations 
with the FPÖ over the distribution of ministerial seats in the government. The ÖVP 
was, for example, able to continue to position itself as the “European party”, as 
the foreign ministry was headed by Benita Ferrero-Waldner (Gehler 2002: 197). 
The opposition expressed satisfaction over the sanctions and made plain their dis-
approval of the government, but the majority of the Austrian population showed 
33 http://www.mzv.cz/_archiv/data_dokumenty/dokumenty92000.html (5 July 2007)
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solidarity with the new cabinet.34 Thanks to this unexpected confrontation, the 
Austrian government, which had initially not been very united, pulled together in 
a sense of solidarity, and even the positions of the Austrian Chancellor and the 
head of the ÖVP Schüssel were strengthened (Gehler 2005: 891). The full force of 
these circumstances became evident in the early parliamentary elections held in the 
autumn of 2002, from which the ÖVP emerged as the strongest party.   
After ﬁ ve months of sanctions some member states began to call for normalis-
ing relationships with Austria (e.g. Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, and Spain). 
Austria’s policy of quiet diplomacy helped foster this attitude (Gehler 2005: 895). 
The solution to this stalemate, when even the European public began to feel that the 
sanctions were counterproductive, was the Report of the “Three Wise Men”.35 This 
three-member committee recommended ending the sanctions. The justiﬁ cation for 
the decision was not that the FPÖ in the position of a government party had aban-
doned its populist statements, but rather fears about a rise in nationalism and nega-
tive attitudes towards the EU in Austria (Gehler 2002: 210). Based on this report the 
sanctions against Austria were terminated unconditionally on 12 September 2000. 
Case 3: Austria and eastern EU enlargement
Debate on some of the more problematic chapters of the EU’s eastern enlarge-
ment (free movement of labour, energy) culminated in 2001. At that time Austria’s 
position in the EU was still weak from the sanctions against it in the ﬁ rst half of 
2000. The government hoped to assert its interests in the issues of Temelín and 
freight transit, but, with the exception of members of the FPÖ, the Austrian position 
on eastern enlargement was favourable, though eastern enlargement was one issue 
where the position of the Austrian government (except for the FPÖ) was at odds 
with the views of the population. Austrians were for the most part sceptical about 
admitting the candidate countries from Central and Eastern Europe.  
The foreign ministry assigned the former Vice-Chancellor Erhard Busek with the 
task of coordinating the enlargement policy and launched a targeted information 
campaign. In the spring of 2001 Austrians were, next to the Fins and the Danes, the 
most informed about the issues of eastern enlargement. Over 30 % of respondents 
in a survey answered that they were “very well or well informed” about the EU 
enlargement (Eurobarometr 55, April/May 2001). However, the problem was the 
negative stance of the FPÖ, which (including Vice-Chancellor S. Riess-Passer) 
34 The sanctions made a domestic policy issue internal to Austria a European issue. Next to Kurt 
Waldheim (President 1986-1992), Jörg Haider became the best known Austrian ﬁ gure outside 
Austria in Europe and the world.
35 Martti Ahtisaari (former Finnish president), Jochen Frowein (renowned German lawyer), Marce-
lino Oreja (former Spanish foreign minister).
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wanted to veto the Czech Republic’s accession over the unresolved issue of the 
Temelín nuclear power plant. Despite constructive efforts in support of enlarge-
ment on the part of the foreign ministry (run by the ÖVP), from 2001 up to the 
conclusion of negotiations in Copenhagen in December 2002, Austria was viewed 
by the European Commission and some member states as a country rather more 
obstructive than supportive of the enlargement process (Gehler 2005: 867). The 
situation improved somewhat after the elections in 2002, when a stronger ÖVP was 
able to set a clear pro-European course. Austria then ratiﬁ ed the accession treaty, 
which was signed on 16 April 2003.
Conclusion 
During its thirteen-year membership in the EU Austria has demonstrated that 
it is capable of taking part in every kind of integration project as a fully ﬂ edged 
member. It has been careful to ensure that its activities in the European Union have 
not been at odds with its commitments arising from its position of constitutional 
neutrality. The way in which its status of neutrality has been interpreted has enabled 
Austria to take an active part in the Common foreign and security policy of the EU 
(CFSP) and to support these aspects of integration in discussions of the Convention 
on the Future of Europe (Gehler 2005: 978).36 However, Austria continues to regard 
itself as a state that will not take part in defence and military alliances, and for that 
reason it did not enter NATO.
At the centre of our analysis was the level of Europeanization of Austrian in-
stitutions. We can conclude that its adaptation to EU models was effective. In the 
domestic coordination of European policy, modiﬁ cations occurred in relation to 
the demands of effective membership. No radical changes were made to political 
decision-making. A system where European affairs are dealt with by the relevant 
ministry, which is typical of Austrian politics, is still in effect. However, the increase 
in the powers of the Chancellor compared to the Foreign Ministry shows institution-
ally how important and complex European policy is. Some actors such as the Federal 
States expected a more pronounced increase in their powers as a result of Austria’s 
participation in the EU. At the formal level their potential inﬂ uence indeed increased, 
but in practical terms they rarely have an inﬂ uence on national decisions.  
Successful periods in Austria’s EU membership have included its Presidency in 
1998 and 2006 (case 1), the adoption of the Euro as ofﬁ cial state currency, and the 
constructive approach taken by Austrian deputies, for example, during negotiations 
36 Austrian representatives in the Convention, Hannes Farnleitner (ÖVP) and Herbert Bosch (FPÖ), 
drew on a proposal from the Italian Presidency and called for including in the European Consti-
tution a clause on the military obligation of other member states to come to the aid of any EU 
member under attack. 
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on the European Convention. In these cases the high level of Europeanization cor-
responded with Austria’s positive attitude towards the European affairs and the very 
positive reﬂ ections of Austria in EU institutions and in the other EU member states. 
Austria’s integration policy between 1995 and 2008 shows that even a small member 
country can become the centre of EU attention, whether in a negative (sanctions) or 
positive (the Presidency) sense. 
In the second part of the study we discussed in detail more problematic issues. 
Austria’s membership in the European Union has also experienced moments of 
crisis. Austria became even more a target of attention when its relationship with 
other member states deteriorated after it allowed Jörg Haider’s populist right-wing 
Freedom Party of Austria to take part in forming the government (case 2). The 
biggest conﬂ ict was the sanctions the other member states imposed on Austria in 
2000. The impact that crisis had on Austria’s European policy was not just a loss 
of prestige but even a loss of manoeuvring space in the future. Even though rela-
tions between Austria and the other member states quickly returned to normal once 
the sanctions were repealed, the crisis weakened the country’s ability to effectively 
assert its speciﬁ c national interests within the EU. It also had an impact on actors 
in domestic policy. On the one hand, public support for European integration de-
creased and Austrians realized how important national sovereignty is to them. 
Also, Austria’s policy towards the EU’s eastern enlargement (case 3) was a strong 
reﬂ ection of the country’s domestic political constellation. This means that the so-
cietal adaptation was not as successful as the Europeanization of Austrian state 
institutions. During the accession talks with eastern candidate countries, the Fed-
eral Government of Wolfgang Schüssel displayed a resistance to some aspects of 
expansion that Austria saw as negative (e.g. the Temelín nuclear power plant in 
the Czech Republic, free movement of labour from the new candidate countries 
within the labour market of the EU 15, Alpine transit). In addition to disagreements 
between Austria and the EU over freight transit through the Austrian Alps, Aus-
tria also temporarily threatened to veto eastern enlargement in 2004. The Austrian 
government’s adaptability with regard to EU affairs helped it to defend its position 
in the EU. However, political trends in domestic politics not only inﬂ uenced the 
European policy of the country (case 2), but had a decisive impact on the basic rela-
tionship between Austria and other EU member states during the sanctions in 2000. 
On the other hand, Austria was able to begin looking for new allies in the European 
Union37 and given its geographic position it began to make use of the potential that 
the 2004/2007 eastern expansion into the states of Central and Eastern Europe had 
37 A proposal put forth by the Austrian foreign minister Benita Ferrero-Waldner in 2001 to create 
a “strategic partnership” between Austria and the Central European states of Poland, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and Slovenia was made towards this end. 
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to offer. Despite its reserved attitude towards some points in the process, eastern 
enlargement brought Austria some positive economic impulses and even came to 
have a stimulating effect on the development of the City of Vienna.
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